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Editor

EDITORIAL
The decision rendered by the supreme
Accountant Owns His
judicial
court of Massachusetts in the
Working Papers
appeal from the finding of the superior
court of Suffolk county, Massachusetts, in the case Ipswich Mills
against William Dillon and another, is perhaps the most important
adjudication by a court of last resort in the legal history of ac
countancy. The decision was unanimous and supported in every
particular the contention of the accounting profession that the
accountant is and always will be, in the absence of express contract
to the contrary, the owner of the working papers which he com
piles preparatory to the final report. To the accountant this has
always seemed so obvious that to call in question the right to his
working papers and similar preliminary documents has savored of
the absurd. There has never been any principle of law or equity
which has appeared to cast doubt upon the validity of a profes
sional man’s absolute title to what is solely his property and not
by any stretch of imagination the property of any one else. It is
true that there may be cases of such extraordinary nature that the
parties may agree to hold in a common place of secrecy and safety
all documents which may have a bearing upon the matters at
issue, and such a repository may be the office of the accountant or
of the client. But fortunately these instances are very rare and
when they occur are almost invariably covered by a specific con
tract or agreement. In the absence of arrangement for such ex
ceptional privacy, custom of the profession vests ownership of
everything other than the original copy of the final report in the
accountant. This custom is based upon equity and common sense
as well as upon analogy of the precedents set in other professions.
During the last few years, however, there has arisen in a few
instances an inclination to deny the right of the accountant to his
working papers. In the new law for the regulation of the ac
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counting profession in Florida it is provided that all working
papers shall be and remain the property of the accountant, and
this indicates nothing more than a desire to remove from the
category of uncertainty a question of vast significance to the
profession. It seems strange that this vital question should have
been answered solely by precedent and custom all these years and
that there was, prior to the case now under consideration, no
decision by a competent court confirming to the accountant the
rights which by common consent have always been his. Probably
the absence of appeal to the courts has been due to the self-evident
justice of the accountant’s claim. Whatever the reason may be,
the fact remains that the decision now rendered by the supreme
court of Massachusetts is the first on record. The precedent thus
set should be controlling, for the court from which the finding
emanates is one of high repute and long established ability.
When the case was first heard and the
The Institute Enters
accountant’s rights appeared to be jeop
the Case
ardized the matter was reported to the
American Institute of Accountants. It seemed to the Institute’s
executive authorities that this was a case in which the whole pro
fession was intimately concerned and, accordingly, counsel for the
Institute was requested to take such steps as were necessary to
secure a reversal by the highest court of the state. Thereafter
the case was conducted by the Institute’s counsel and counsel for
the Massachusetts Society of Certified Public Accountants and
the costs involved were assumed by the Institute. Had the judg
ment of the lower court been permitted to stand unchallenged the
whole profession might have been annoyed by claims of clients
based upon the Ipswich Mills-Dillon case and the weight of a
precedent would have been against equity and law. It was
better therefore to appeal at once and thus to set at rest the ques
tion which had arisen and had been answered in the lower court
in a way which would have been subversive of justice. Now the
supreme judicial court has rendered the decision which was ex
pected and right is done. The chief argument of the plaintiff’s
counsel throughout the case was that the accountants were
employees of the company and that the accountant’s assumption
of status as a professional practitioner was not tenable. The
judgment now rendered disposes, we trust for all time, of the idea
that public accountancy is not a profession. It should be added
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that Judge Weed of the lower court, realizing the importance of
the case, had reported it to the supreme judicial court for a review
of his decision.
The case is of such far-reaching impor
Brief of
tance that we make no apology for quot
Amicus Curiæ
ing extensively from brief and from
judgment. The brief presented on behalf of the defendants was
prepared by J. Harry Covington of Washington, D. C., chief of
counsel for the American Institute of Accountants, and by Robert
G. Dodge, counsel for the Massachusetts Society of Certified
Public Accountants. It categorically dissents from all the find
ings of the lower court excepting as to the ownership of certain
papers which originated in the plaintiff’s office—the defendants
had conceded this point from the beginning and had not made any
claim to ownership. The high court’s decision accepts all these
contentions and sustains the arguments. Before presenting the
judgment of the final court it is of interest to consider the sup
porting brief of amicus curiae, representing the American Institute
of Accountants.

In the Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth
Suffolk county
March sitting, 1927
(No. 2237)
Ipswich Mills
v.
William Dillon and Schuyler Dillon
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIÆ, REPRESENTING THE AMERICAN INSTI
TUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS

This brief is filed on behalf of the American Institute of Ac
countants in support of the defendants’ position in this case.
The American Institute of Accountants contains within its
membership persons in all parts of the United States who are
engaged in the practice of public accountancy. In each of the
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia there are statutes
regulating such practice, and providing for examinations designed
to demonstrate technical skill in accountancy and education in
related subjects on the part of a person as a prerequisite to the
issuance to him of a certificate as a certified public accountant.
Such persons thereafter hold themselves out to the public as
ready to perform the highly skilled services required of a public
accountant today, and they are engaged by their clients as pro
fessional persons to do specific tasks in the field of accountancy.
The defendants in this case are certified public accountants duly
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admitted to practice in the state of Massachusetts (Record, pp. 20
and 122).
The trial court correctly found, among other things, as follows:
“ I find that the term ‘ work sheets ’ means papers on which original compila
tions, computations and analyses are made by accountants which later are
gathered together in a summary form and the figures rendered in the schedule,
exhibit, report or return upon which the accountant is working” (Rec. p. 15).

But the court, while holding that the preparation of the “work
sheets” or working papers was work of a character requiring ac
counting skill and experience and good judgment in reaching
sound and dependable conclusions where original entries were
obscure or vouchers missing, erroneously held in respect of the
possession of the “work sheets” as follows:
“ By fair implication the information gained by the defendants and compiled
on the work sheets and even the paper itself is the property of the plaintiff. If
the defendants have any interest in the papers and the information there
gathered, it is solely for the purpose of defending the integrity of their work, and
goes no farther than suitable protection against the destruction or alteration of
such papers and not to a superior right to the possession thereof.”

This is apparently the first case in the United States which
directly involves the question whether the accountant owns his
working papers, and the amicus curiae, representing the account
ing profession of the country and believing the position of the
defendants regarding the ownership of such papers to be correct,
supports their contention.
In the work of the accountant, whether in regard to making the
ordinary annual audits and reports, or in regard to the prepara
tion of evidence for an income-tax case, there is involved an exam
ination of the books, records, vouchers, etc., of the accountant’s
client. Of course, these books, records, vouchers, etc., belong to
the client. The accountant simply examines them, either in the
office of the client or, in some cases, he may take them away to his
own office. As he makes the examination, it is the practice to
make notes of the facts which the accountant believes will be
material as a basis for his report or opinion. In practice these
notes are usually made on long sheets of paper which the ac
countant designates as his working papers. Thereafter, from his
working papers the accountant compiles the final report, which he
certifies as an accountant and which he submits to his client.
If at the conclusion of his professional task for which he has
been employed the accountant, after delivering his report, should
destroy all his notes, that is to say, his working papers, certainly
no action in tort would lie for such action. And yet, if the title
to such working papers is in the client, the right to recover in such
an action would be the logical conclusion.
Without burdening the court with additional argument, it is
urged that the right of the public accountant to retain the pos
session of his working papers subject to any legitimate interest of
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his client is obviously a vital one to him and is based upon the
soundest considerations.
And the amicus curiae, having read the brief of the defendants,
concurs in the arguments presented therein.
Respectfully submitted,
Spencer Gordon, Washington, D. C.
Of Counsel for
American Institute of Accountants.

This brief summarizes with commend
able clarity the essential points at issue.
It is not with the details of an individual
case that the Institute is primarily concerned. It is very greatly
concerned, however, with the protection of the profession as a
whole. And now after ample time for consideration the court of
last resort renders the decision which is destined to be a leading
case for years to come.
Judgment of
Supreme Court

Ipswich Mills v. William Dillon and Another

Suffolk.

Argued March 8, 1927

Opinion filed July 5, 1927

Present: Rugg, C. J., Braley, Pierce, Carroll, & Wait, JJ.
Accountant, Ownership of letters, work sheets, and memoranda.
Agency, Independent contractor.

Reservation and report by Weed, J., of a suit in equity heard by
him in the superior court.
Carroll, J. The question involved in this suit in equity is the
ownership of certain papers. The plaintiff is a manufacturer of
hosiery. The defendants are accountants, father and son, who
have been partners since January 1, 1921. In 1912 or 1913 the
father, and later the firm, were employed by the plaintiff as ac
countants to make an annual audit, to prepare tax returns, and to
perform services on matters of bookkeeping, cost accounting and
statements for banks. This employment continued until Decem
ber, 1925. In 1922 or 1923 the defendants were employed to
conduct a federal tax case before the bureau of internal revenue as
attorneys in fact for the plaintiff. While a federal revenue agent
was making an examination of the plaintiff’s returns for the years
1922,1923,1924, he was sent by the plaintiff to the defendants to
examine certain papers in their possession relating to the plain
tiff’s affairs, more particularly the defendants’ “work sheets’’
relating to the revaluation of the plant assets and to certain ad
justed inventories developed in their work on the tax case. The
defendants refused the revenue agent access to these papers. On
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January 6, 1926, the plaintiff demanded of the defendants “all
papers in your possession belonging to Ipswich Mills.” No papers
were delivered and this suit was instituted.
All the papers involved which were in the defendants’ posses
sion were produced by them at the trial. They were examined by
the parties, grouped, initialed and impounded, awaiting the final
decision of the case. Group A consisted of papers that originated
in the plaintiff’s office or in the office of its selling agents, or of
someone associated with them, including papers relating to the
1917 federal tax return of the plaintiff. The defendants conceded
that the plaintiff is the owner of these papers in group A, and en
titled to possession of them. Group B included copy of the
amended federal tax return of the plaintiff for the year 1918, and
certain papers (not work sheets) relating thereto. In group C
there were copies of the plaintiff’s tentative and amended tax
return for 1919 with work sheets and correspondence in con
nection therewith. In group D were papers and work sheets of
the revaluation of the plaintiff’s plant assets. The papers in
group E were the defendants’ work sheets of their July, 1922,
report. Group F included papers, reports, returns, copies, work
sheets, data, correspondence and memoranda respecting the tax
case, together with some letters originating in the plaintiff’s
office.
It was found by the trial judge that work sheets meant papers
on which original compilations, computations and analyses are
made by accountants, which later are gathered together in a sum
mary form and the figures rendered in a schedule, exhibit, report
or return upon which the accountant is working. The judge
ruled that the plaintiff was the owner of the papers in groups B,
C, D and E, and entitled to the immediate possession of them, the
defendants being entitled to take and preserve such photostatic
copies as they desired. With reference to the papers initialed F,
the judge ruled that the parties were jointly interested in these
particular papers, with the right in the plaintiff to take them
temporarily from the defendants. An order for a decree was
made. The case was then reported to this court.
Concerning the papers marked B, which consist of “copy of
amended federal tax return of the plaintiff for 1918 and certain
papers (not work sheets) relating thereto,” the judge found “the
defendants were under employ as accountants—auditing, check
ing up and verifying, and making a research for the original costs
of the plaintiff’s plant assets then in use and applying depreciation
figures decided upon by the directors with respect to the different
classes of property. It was work of a character requiring account
ing skill and experience, and good judgment in reaching sound and
dependable conclusions where original entries were obscure or
vouchers missing. It was fully paid for by the plaintiff.” We
assume that the original tax return was delivered to the plaintiff
and the copy of this return retained by the defendants. The
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defendants were not the agents or servants of the plaintiff; they
were independent contractors. In the making of the documents
and papers and in collecting the information involved in them, the
defendants were independent accountants engaged in their own
occupation. See Pearl v. West End Street Railway, 176 Mass. 177,
179; Leverone v. Arancio, 179 Mass. 439,443. They had the right
to make and retain copies of the tax return. It might be neces
sary to have possession of the copies if the accuracy of their work
was questioned. There was nothing in the contract of employ
ment which required the defendants to surrender this copy and in
the absence of such an agreement they could not be compelled to
surrender it. The other papers relating to the federal tax return
of 1918, mentioned in group B, we understand are office copies of
letters sent by the defendants. The defendants could retain
copies of these letters as well as copies of the schedules which are
indicated by the evidence as being a part of the “papers ... re
lating thereto.” This copy of the return and the papers relating
thereto may have contained information of importance to the
plaintiff. The right of the plaintiff to restrain its publication is
not before us. Even if it be assumed that the defendants could be
enjoined from the publication of the contents of these papers, the
title to them was in the defendants.
Group C consisted of (1) carbon copies of letters from the de
fendants to the plaintiff; (2) original letters from the plaintiff to
the defendants; (3) original letters to the defendants from the
plaintiff’s attorneys; and (4) carbon copies of letters from the
defendants to the collector of internal revenue.
The carbon copies of the defendants’ letters to the plaintiff
were the property of the defendants. The plaintiff did not own
these copies and was not entitled to their possession. The con
tract of employment did not require the defendants to furnish
these copies to the plaintiff.
The original letters from the plaintiff to the defendants belonged
to the defendants. They were the recipients, and therefore
owned them. It was decided in Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599,
606, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, that as a general
rule the publication of letters may be restrained by the author,
but in the absence of some special arrangement the recipient of the
letter is the owner. “The author parts with the physical and
material elements which are conveyed by and in the envelope.
These are given to the receiver. The paper upon which the letter
is written belongs to the receiver. Oliver v. Oliver, 11 C. B. (N. S.)
139. Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush, 480, 486. Pope v. Curl, 2
Ark. 341. Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 142 Fed.
Rep. 827, 830. A duty of preservation would impose an unrea
sonable burden in most instances. It is obvious that no such obli
gation rests upon the receiver, and he may destroy or keep at
pleasure.” The same principle is applicable to the letters sent
from the plaintiff’s attorneys to the defendants. As the de
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fendants were the receivers of these letters, they were the prop
erty of the defendants.
The carbon copies of the defendants’ letters to the collector of
internal revenue did not belong to the plaintiff. Whatever right
it may have to examine these copies, or take copies of them,
which point we are not called upon to decide, the defendants’
copies did not belong to the plaintiff; they were owned by the de
fendants. The fact that the copies of these letters concern the
plaintiff is not a sufficient reason for depriving the defendants of
their property. In writing the letters the defendants were not the
plaintiff’s servants.
In group C there are copies of federal tax returns. These, as we
understand from the record, were the defendants’ office copies.
The record shows that copies of all returns and schedules prepared
by the defendants for the plaintiff were sent to the plaintiff.
Even if the plaintiff has a right to require further copies, a question
not involved in this suit, it has no right to demand of the defend
ants the surrender of these office copies. They were the property
of the defendants.
The work sheets, as defined by the trial judge, were the de
fendants’ property. They were made by them while engaged in
their own business. The paper on which the computations were
made belonged to them. They were not employed to make these
sheets. The sheets were merely the means by which the work for
which the defendants were employed might be accomplished.
The title to the work sheets remained in the defendants after the
computations were made. In the absence of an agreement that
these sheets were to belong to the plaintiff, or were to be held for
it, they were owned by the defendants. It may be that these
papers contained information confidential in its nature and of
importance to the plaintiff; but the defendants did not receive this
information as the plaintiff’s servants. It has been held that
plans prepared by an architect employed for that purpose belong
to the one for whom they are made. Walsh v. St. Louis Exposi
tion & Music Hall Association, 101 Mo. 534, 535. Gibbon v.
Pease [1905], 1 K. B. 810. See Kutts v. Pelby, 20 Pick. 65, 66.
But it has never been decided so far as we know that the prelimi
nary plans and sketches of an architect belong to the person ;by
whom the architect is employed, see in this connection Rutan w.
Coolidge, 241 Mass. 584; nor has it been held so far as we are
aware that the preliminary sketches and drawings of an artist
employed to paint a portrait belong to the sitter; or that memo
randa made by a physician of his examination of a patient, or the
notes and records of a lawyer, his preliminary drafts of legal docu
ments or his minutes of testimony, belong respectively to the
patient or client. See Anonymous Case, 31 Maine, 590; In re
Wheatcroft, 6 Ch. D. 97. As to property rights in a negative where
a photograph is taken for pay in the usual course, see Boucas v.
Cooke [1903], 2 K. B. 227, 238; Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch.
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D. 345. The interest of the plaintiff in the information collected
and copied by the defendants and the confidential nature of this
information do not give title to the plaintiff of the defendants’
working papers. They were made by the defendants solely for
their own assistance in preparing the tax returns.
With reference to group F, the letters addressed to the de
fendants, copies of letters written by the defendants, copies of
returns furnished to the plaintiff, and work sheets relating to the
tax case, are the sole property of the defendants, and this is true of
the papers and reports collected by the defendants in the prepa
ration of the tax case. The plaintiff is not jointly interested with
the defendants in these documents. We do not understand that
any of these reports, papers and returns were property of the
plaintiff which had been placed in the defendants’ custody by the
plaintiff or merely delivered to the defendants. If there are any
papers belonging to the plaintiff which were lent to the defendants,
the plaintiff is entitled to them; but as we construe the record, the
papers referred to in group F were gathered and collected by the
defendants in the course of their business, and were not papers of
the plaintiff placed by it in the defendants’ possession.
On the record of the evidence disclosed in this case, the de
fendants were under no legal obligation to surrender their working
sheets or other papers to the plaintiff. The testimony of Leonard
and Dillon does not prove that the defendants gave the plaintiff
any right or title in them. It is apparent that at one time papers
in the possession of the defendants, including their working papers,
were turned over to the plaintiff, for which receipts were given by
the plaintiff to the defendants. These papers were again returned
to the defendants. The plaintiff contends that by this trans
action the plaintiff’s rights of property and possession of all these
papers were settled. Dillon testified that these papers were
merely lent to the plaintiff. An investigation of the letters and
receipts, and an examination of the record, do not satisfy us that
the defendants in placing these documents in the possession of the
plaintiff intended to part with their title and property in them.
It follows that the papers in group A belong to the plaintiff.
The other papers and documents belong to the defendants. A
decree is to be entered for the plaintiff, directing that the plaintiff
is the owner and entitled to immediate possession of the docu
ments described in group A.
Ordered accordingly.
J. Harry Covington, of Washington, D. C., representing the
American Institute of Accountants, and Robert G. Dodge, of
Boston, Massachusetts, representing the Massachusetts Society
of Certified Public Accountants, appeared formally and filed a
brief on behalf of Mr. Dillon. Spencer Gordon, of Washington,
D. C., filed a brief as friend of the court on behalf of the American
Institute of Accountants.
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There is nothing to add to the conclusiveness of this decision.
The accountants in the case, the Institute and especially Institute
counsel are to be congratulated upon a complete vindication of
inherent right.
Every member of the American Insti
Institute’s Annual
tute
of Accountants who can attend the
Meeting
annual meeting to be held at Del
Monte, California, next month will be fortunate. The responses
which are coming in indicate that there is a widespread interest
in the arrangements which are being made for the comfort and
entertainment of those who will attend. The meeting of the
Dominion Association of Chartered Accountants at Winnipeg is
one of the most attractive features of the trip which has been
planned for members from east of the Rocky mountains. The
hospitality of the Canadian accountants is well known to many
persons who have been present at the Dominion meetings of past
years. All Americans regard the people of Canada as friends
and it is ever a pleasure to meet and reaffirm the sentiments of
international amity for which such a convention as that of
Winnipeg gives opportunity. After the American expeditionary
forces leave Canada they are to spend three days in Yellowstone
Park, which in September is at its beautiful best. Thence the
itinerary includes Spokane, where there is to be time enough for
sightseeing and a dinner dance. At Seattle there will be an en
tire day and at Portland time enough to see some of the most im
portant things which that city has to offer. At San Francisco
there will be a party at the Bohemian Club and a trip to Mount
Tamalpais. The train will arrive at Del Monte in the late eve
ning of Sunday, September 19th. After the meetings are over
the train will then proceed to Los Angeles, where there will be
three days devoted to sightseeing and entertainment. The
party leaves for the east on Monday, September 26th, and after
stopping at Riverside and spending a day and evening at the
Grand Canyon, is due to reach Chicago on September 30th.
Papers already announced for the annual meeting include an ad
dress by Henry Rand Hatfield of the University of California
and one by Robert H. Montgomery, whose subject will be “Ac
countants’ Limitations.” Speakers at the banquet to be held
at Del Monte on September 21st are yet to be announced, but the
committee in charge of programme has promised that eminent
men will be present.
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